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In  this  paper  we  examine  the  sourcing  strategies  of  clothing  firms  in  the 
developed economies of the UK and Germany in the context of their national 
institutional framework. We argue that, as a result of their embeddedness in 
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and  make  different  locational  choices.  We  place  particular  emphasis  on  the 
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product that they retain. We suggest that the construction of global production 
networks and control over supplier firms is mediated by co-ordinating firms’ 
product  strategy  and  the  degree  of  dependence  on  national  retailers  this 
engenders. In the UK and Germany, firms and their networks differ from the US 
case which is normally taken as representative of the industry. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although  production  networks  in  the  clothing  industry  are  correctly 
characterised as highly global (Dicken, 2003), the national institutional context 
of individual clothing firms is an important factor in the construction of these 
networks. It shapes both the competences that firms develop and the strategies 
they adopt (Lane and Probert, 2004). The global production network (GPN) 
literature  (e.g.  Gereffi,  1994,  2002;  Palpacuer,  2000)  views  the  clothing 
industry’s supply chains in terms of its impact on developing countries. We 
learn much less about the internal capabilities of clothing firms and how these 
shape network governance.  
 
We  examine  the  sourcing  strategies  of  clothing  firms  in  the  developed 
economies of the UK and Germany in the context of their national institutional 
framework.  We  argue  that,  as  a  result  of  their  embeddedness  in  divergent 
national structures, these firms pursue different sourcing strategies and make 
different locational choices. We place particular emphasis on the different mix 
of arms’ length and relational contracting that firms develop, and on the varying 
degree  of  control  over  the  manufacturing  process  and  the  product  that  they 
retain.  We  further  suggest  that  the  construction  of  GPNs  and  control  over 
supplier  firms  is  mediated  by  co-ordinating  firms’  product  strategy  and  the 
degree of dependence on national retailers this engenders.  
 
The  developed  countries  of  Europe  and  the  United  States  have  for  decades 
sought to protect their domestic textile and clothing industries from competition 
by  newly  industrialising  countries,  where  low  wage  rates  favour  the 
development of low capital, highly labour intensive industries, such as clothing, 
that resist technological rationalisation. The measures taken have significantly 
distorted global trade in textiles and clothing and sustained the current division 
of  labour  between  developed  and  developing  countries.  Through  the  Multi-
Fibre  Arrangement  (MFA)  of  1974-1994,  governments  imposed  quotas  on 
garments imported from developing countries; these restrictions were phased 
out  in  1995-2004  under  the  Agreement  on  Textiles  and  Clothing  (ATC). 
Regional agreements, meanwhile, granted certain countries privileged access to 
EU  markets  by  lifting  quota  restrictions  and  reducing  or  eliminating  tariffs. 
Among the most important of these was the 1982 preferential agreement on 
Outward Processing Traffic (OPT), which permitted the temporary export of 
fabric from EU countries to another customs area for processing and subsequent 
re-import  (Dunford  and  Greco,  2005  Ch.6).  Trade  with  Central  and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries was almost entirely liberalised in 1998. All these 
arrangements have had a significant impact on the selection of both foreign   2 
manufacturing sites and of suppliers, as well as precipitating changes in such 
arrangements over time. 
 
The phasing out of the MFA/ATC and implementation of the various regional 
agreements have sharply increased global competition. The data we present for 
the  UK  and  Germany  show  that  conditions  for  the  clothing  industry  in 
developed countries have significantly worsened during the last decade or so. 
Although the full impact on western firms of quota removal since 1 January 
2005 is not yet clear, co-ordinating firms welcomed the expected effects of a 
reduction  in  both  financial  and  transaction  costs  (Interview  Notes  2003). 
Nevertheless, the dismantling of trade barriers threatens to undermine the ability 
of  clothing  firms  to  remain  the  lynchpin  of  retailer-supplier  networks,  as 
retailers  increase  the  proportion  of  clothes  they  buy  directly  from  low-cost 
producers  in  developing  countries.  This  will  undermine  the  raison  d’être  of 
western clothing firms that have not built their own brand and are active in 
lower-quality segments. 
 
Our  analysis  of  domestically  anchored  firms,  inserted  into  a  network  of 
national, international and global relationships with customers and suppliers, is 
informed by and seeks to integrate three sets of theoretical literature. We link 
the strategic management literature on the development of capabilities within 
firms with the political economy literature, which shifts the analytical focus to 
global chains/networks. We argue that the degree of power/control exerted by 
clothing  firms  within  networks  is  decisively  shaped  by  their  domestically 
developed  capabilities.  Last,  our  emphasis  on  co-ordinating  firms’ 
embeddedness in contrasting institutional environments is informed by a critical 
reading of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature, particularly the work of 
Hall and Soskice (2001). 
 
The  paper  has  the  following  structure.  Section  II  outlines  the  theoretical 
framework  adopted.  Section  III  describes and  analyses  the German  and  UK 
clothing  firms  in  their  global  and  national  contexts.  Section  IV  analyses 
sourcing  strategies  and  modes  of  third  party  contracting  and  examines 
qualitative  aspects  of  supplier  relationships.  The  Conclusion  highlights  our 
main  findings  and  the  theoretical  insights  developed,  emphasising  their 
relevance to the global commodity chains/production networks literatures and to 
the wider debate on the interaction between globalisation and national varieties 
of capitalism. 
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The data draw on analysis of 50 in-depth interviews conducted by the authors in 
2003-4  with  high-level  managers/owners  of  British  and  German  firms  and 
associations in the textiles, clothing and retail industries. For Germany we used 
the Klartext rankings to identify the major players in the clothing industry. In 
the  absence  of  equivalent  listings  for  the  UK,  we  consulted  several  leading 
company, industry and general news databases to compile our own lists. Despite 
the  more  ad  hoc  nature  of  the  UK  compilation,  we  are  confident  that  we 
identified  the  most  important  players.  Multiple  approaches  to  firms  yielded 
interviews in 11 British clothing firms (a 35% success rate) and 13 German 
firms (43%), supplemented by  five British retailers (56%) and four German 
retailers  (31%).  Supplementary  interviews  were  carried  out  in  textile  firms 
(seven British and four German firms), associations and two clothing and two 
textile  supplier  firms  in  China.
1  We  used  Atlas.ti  software  to  assist  us  in  a 
qualitative analysis of the recorded and transcribed interviews. Official statistics 
and secondary sources from both countries supplement our findings. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
2.1 The Competence-Based Approach in Strategic Management 
 
To  gain  competitive  advantage,  managers  develop  organisational 
competencies/capabilities
2  which  facilitate  not  only  innovative  responses  to 
market pressures, but also flexible adaptation to unstable and rapidly changing 
markets (Grant, 1996; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Stalk et al., 1992; Teece et 
al., 1997). Capabilities have been variously defined, but most authors emphasise 
the development and combination of various types of knowledge which, when 
embodied in products, are difficult to imitate by competitors and thus ensure a 
firm’s  competitive  advantage.  Such  idiosyncratic,  value-generating 
competencies  vary  between  industries  and  may  be  connected  with  high-
technology development, or be relatively mundane, such as the ‘quick-response’ 
capability of some clothing firms (Richardson, 1996). More often than not they 
now take the form of ‘services’, such as styling features, product images and 
other  attributes  that  only  services  can  create  (Quinn  et  al.,  1991:  302). 
Additionally, the effective co-ordination of internal and external competences 
may be considered a valuable managerial capability (Teece et al., 1997: 515). 
Although  the  knowledge  sedimented  in  competencies  often  is  described  as 
experiential it is clear that it cannot develop unless management and society 
have laid the foundations in the provision of relevant educational qualifications 
and  skills  (Quinn  et  al.,  1991:  301;  Teece  et  al.,  1997).  Thus,  although 
capabilities  are  broader  than  skills  and  are  embodied  in  organisational 
processes,  they  cannot  be  completely  divorced  from  them.  Furthermore,  the 
recruitment and development of employees with high levels of qualifications   4 
and  the  ability  to  continue  learning  also  requires  longer-term  financial 
investment in human resources (Stalk et al., 1992: 59).  
 
Managers’ competitive strategy has to determine core and non-core capabilities. 
They  have  to  distinguish  between  capabilities  unique  to  the  firm  and 
fundamental to its competitive advantage, and those which may be externalised, 
acquired either through market links or in networks (Grant, 1996). In the latter 
case, closer, trust-based and more durable strategic networks are said to result 
(Jarillo, 1995), based on relational contracts (Grant, 1996: 383).  
 
2.2 Organisation of the Value Chain and Firm Types 
 
In this sub-section we derive several different types of clothing firm from the 
mixture of functions/capabilities required to execute the various steps in the 
value chain both efficiently and effectively. (The following adapts and develops 
ideas  from  Dunford,  2002:1-2.)  The  value  chain  in  the  clothing  industry 
embraces several different sets of activity, roles and occupations (Figure I).  
 
 




1) Development  and  planning  of  the  entire  collection  involves  several 
skilled  activities  including  knowledge  of  market  trends  and  of  fabric 
availability, the integration of both into development of product lines, and 
the costing of the planned collection.  
2) Design  and  prototyping  of  new  models  requires  both  creativity  and 
technical aptitude in addition to understanding market demand and cost 
structures.  
3) Production design and sample-making concerns the most cost-efficient 
means of producing the item, bearing in mind quality standards and fit. 
Decisions on manufacturing location are also brought into consideration.  
4) The actual manufacture and assembly of garments, or CMT (cut-make-
trim),  involves  mainly  semi-skilled  sewing  and  assembly  operations, 
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5) Marketing seeks to match retail outlets to the quality and character of the 
clothes, and to achieve the broadest possible market access in a given 
segment.  
6) Distribution entails an increasingly sophisticated logistics operation often 
based on computerised order tracking and inventory control systems.  
7) Finally, the garments reach consumers through various retail channels.  
 
In principle these seven steps can be separated from each other and performed 
in  different  locations,  since  they  involve  clearly  identified  costs  as  well  as 
different sets of capabilities and occupations. The manner of fragmenting the 
value chain and its distribution of functions across different locations depends 
not only  on available competencies and cost considerations, but also on the 
nature  of  the  final  product.  In  addition,  and  parallel  to  processes  of  de-
verticalization,  processes  of  functional  integration  have  been  notable, 
particularly in the retailing function. 
 
Our  analysis  leads  us  to  identify  at  least  five  different  types  of  clothing 
enterprise, each with its own way of organising the clothing value chain (table 
1).
3  Each  type,  as  section  IV  demonstrates,  involves  different  decisions 
regarding the activities to be externalised through markets or within networks, 
as well as their geographical location. 
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Table 1. Five Types of Clothing Firms
+, Based on Different Combinations 
of Steps in the Value Chain* 
 
 





Utilised  Costs incurred  
Type 1  Branded 
marketers 
High emphasis 














Type2  Domestic 
suppliers to 
large retailers 
Same steps as 
type 1, but 












Type 3  ‘Cut, Make 
and Trim’ 
firms *** 





Type 4  Forward-
integrated 
branded / high 
fashion 
marketers 
A. Steps 1-3, 5-7 
B. Steps 1-7 
As in type 1  A. Combines 
competencies 
of type 1 with 
retailing 
capability. 
B. As A, plus 
manufacturing 
Very high 




















+Includes retailers  
*Steps in value chain: 1. Development of collection; 2. Design; 3. Prototyping of models; 4. 
Manufacturing; 5. Marketing; 6. Distribution/logistics; 7. Retailing. 
** If ‘full package’ suppliers, also buy fabric and trim. 
*** Located in developing countries or in informal sector of developed ones. 
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These five types of clothing enterprise evidently differ in the capabilities and 
capital invested, in the resulting products and hence the markets they can enter, 
and consequently in the degree of autonomy and network power they develop. 
But  power  relations  are  not  of  primary  concern  to  strategic  management 
theories,  which  are  mainly  focused  on  the  firm.  For  an  understanding  of 
network  governance  and  power  relations,  we  turn  to  a  second  theoretical 
perspective,  the  political  economy  literature  on  global  commodity  chains 
(GCCs) and GPNs.  
 
2.3. Power and Control in Global Commodity Chains/Production 
Networks.  
 
Gereffi’s work (1994) on GCCs in the clothing industry centres on the analysis 
of power around a dichotomy of ‘drivers’ in the chain. But his focus mainly on 
buyer-driven chains and large retailers gives insufficient attention to the co-
ordinating  or  ‘middleman’  firms  which, if  they  are  branded  marketers,  may 
develop  a  countervailing  power  to  retailers.  Moreover,  an  in-depth 
consideration of different types of co-ordinating firms illuminates the bases of 
their  power  and  the  differing  ways  they  can  deploy  it  in  the  network. 
Furthermore, his predominant focus on US firms and insufficient consideration 
of firms’ institutional embeddedness limits development of a general theory.  
 
Some of these aspects are better understood by Henderson et al (2002). Their 
detailed  theoretical  specification  of  the  concept  of  the  GPN  permits  the 
identification of sets of firms, linked together in complex, variable and multi-
level (in spatial terms) relationships. Their definition of power as ‘the capacity 
of the lead firm to influence decisions and resource allocations – vis-à-vis other 
firms  in  the  network  –  in  its  own  interests’  (Henderson  et  al.,  2002:  450) 
informs this paper. Last, in common with the authors of this paper, Henderson 
et al (2002: 441) explicitly recognise the importance of national institutional 
contexts, out of which all firms arise and in which – albeit to varying degrees – 
they remain embedded.  
 
Adopting the term GPN, we focus on shifts in control over the organisation of 
the value chain, and over the gains and losses from it that accrue to the three 
main parties involved – the co-ordinating firm, its supplier(s) and retailers, with 
a particular emphasis on the two former.  
 
We concur with Gereffi (1994) that, in many developed countries, large retailers 
are important actors in the network of relationships, and current developments 
are  augmenting  their  power.  But,  as  we  show  in  section  III,  they  are  not 
invariably  the  dominant  network  actor.  Based  on  managerial  and  employee   8 
capabilities, together with financial resources, co-ordinating firms can shape the 
triangle  of  control  by  developing  their  own  power  resources.  Two  sets  of 
capabilities are particularly important. The first is the development of a high-
quality, high-fashion, branded product, which makes it possible to cultivate a 
large and highly diversified retailer base in both domestic and export markets 
while also permitting forward integration into retailing. The second is the skilful 
management of the GPN and the constituent supplier firms, in order to retain a 
high degree of control over the final product.  
 
2.4 Explaining Cross-National Differences  
 
The Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 6ff.) suggests 
that the comparative advantage of firms in differing industries has its origin in 
the  institutional  foundations  of  their  home  nations.  Following  Teece  et  al 
(1997), Hall and Soskice (2001) conceive of firms as developing competencies 
in  interaction  with  other  actors,  compelling  them  to  solve  a  number  of  co-
ordination problems central to the development of their core competencies. Of 
the five areas of such interaction they outline, vocational training and education 
is of particular importance for this paper. But reference will also be made to 
regulatory regimes regarding entrepreneurship, modes of inter-firm contracting, 
and employment relations, as well as to aspects of corporate governance and 
finance.  
 
Hall  and  Soskice  (2001)  further  suggest  that  different  national  political 
economies resolve these co-ordination problems in contrasting ways. Firms in 
different national economies, they argue, will gravitate towards the mode of co-
ordination for which there exists institutional support. They develop two basic 
types of political economy, based on the way in which co-ordination problems 
are resolved: in liberal market economies, markets and hierarchies are the most 
prevalent  co-ordinating  mechanisms,  whereas  in  co-ordinated  market 
economies, firms depend more heavily on non-market mechanisms, entailing 
more extensive relational contracting. 
 
This theory will inform the analysis of the divergent behaviour of German and 
UK firms in section III. In section IV, when we turn to outsourcing and the 
building of global production networks, however, their mainly national focus 
has to be amended. The impact of international rules systems, particularly those 
relating  to  trade,  needs  to  be  incorporated  into  the  analysis,  as  does  a 
consideration  of  the  changing  international  division  of  labour  and  the 
opportunities  and  constraints  it  creates.  It  has  to  be  recognised  that,  in  the 
clothing industry, firms create global production networks to escape constraints 
exerted by national institutions, particularly those shaping the cost of labour.   9 
Finally, it is necessary to consider supplier capabilities in different geographical 
locations and the way this shapes the shifting contours of GPNs. The kinds of 
networks  developed  and  their  governance  therefore  will  be  a  hybrid 
arrangement. They combine behaviours supported by domestic institutions with 
behaviour responding to global opportunities, as well as being influenced by 
suppliers’ national environment and the capabilities it fosters.  
 
3.  The  National  Industries  and  Firms  in  their  Changing  Global  and 
Domestic Contexts. 
 
3.1 National industry structure and capabilities of firms  
 
The competitive pressures caused by huge discrepancies in wage levels between 
developing and developed countries, shown in Figure II, have forced developed 
country firms to reorganise their value chain, usually by outsourcing some or all 
of their production operations to lower-wage countries. Semi-skilled jobs like 
sewing  have  almost  disappeared  from  developed  countries,  and  yet 
governments and firms are not prepared to abandon these industries to firms in 
developing countries.  
 
 
Figure  II.  Clothing  Industry  Costs  per  Working  Minute  in  Different 
Countries (in Euros) 
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￿  uro   0.10 
￿  uro   0.15 
￿  uro   0.50 
￿  uro   0.25  Most industrialised countries 
Threshold countries 
Low wage countries 
Source:   Volksbanken /   Raffeisenbanken  2003 
Germany 
￿  uro   0.10 
￿  uro   0.15 
￿  uro   0.50 
￿  uro   0.25  Most industrialised countries 
Threshold countries 
Low wage countries 
Germany 
￿  uro   0.10 
￿  uro   0.15 
￿  uro   0.50 
￿  uro   0.25  Most industrialised countries 
Threshold countries 
Low wage countries 
Source:   Volksbanken /   Raffeisenbanken  2003   10 
The UK and German clothing industries were important contributors to both 
employment and GNP for most of the post-war period but in recent decades 
have  experienced  a  precipitous  decline  in  the  face  of  developing  country 
competition. In Britain, employment fell by over 40 percent to 127,000 in the 
period 1995-2000, and production value declined by 40 percent to £4.8 billion 
in 1996-2002 (BATC, 2003, estimates from ONS data). Some 1,600 firms (-19 
percent) disappeared during this time (Euratex, 2002). Employment in Germany 
started declining earlier, because of earlier relocation of production, but again 
the strongest overall decrease was in the 1990s. By 2000, both employment and 
the number of firms remaining had fallen to around one-third of their 1990 level 
(Groemling  and  Matthes,  2003).  According  to  IHK  Bielefeld  (undated),  in 
1995-2002  employment  among  firms  with  over  20  people  declined  more 
sharply (-49 percent) than turnover (-19 percent). 
 
Table 2 shows the extent of the UK productivity deficit with Germany: higher 
turnover in the German industry is achieved by a significantly lower number of 
employees.  Significant  differences  in  firm  size,  indicative  of  lower  capital 
resources, partially explain the poor UK showing. In the German industry, 85 
percent of turnover is generated by large and medium-sized firms employing 
100-999 people (Euratex, 2002). Only a handful of firms are very large, yet 
some 20-30 brands are globally traded (BBI, 2002: 11). The top 100 firms are 
internationally competitive. Each achieves more than Euro 25 million in sales 
and,  according  to  Volksbanken  Raiffeisenbanken  (2003:  2)
4,  together  they 
generate nearly two-thirds of the sector’s annual turnover. Since the end of the 
1990s when the two giant public companies, Coats Viyella and Courtauld, were 
broken up, the UK industry comprises a small number of large and medium-
sized firms and a large number of small firms (CAPITB Trust, 2001: 8). Nearly 
three-quarters  of  clothing  manufacturers  are  reported  to  turn  over  less  than 
£250,000  per  annum  (Warren,  2003:  233).  Ethnic  minority  owners  are 
prominent in this latter group (around 35 percent, according to CAPITB Trust, 
2001: 5), some of which constitute an informal, regionally based sector. No 
equivalent  informal  sector  is  apparent  in  Germany,  despite  regional 
concentrations  of  ethnic  minorities,  due  to  greater  regulation  of  both 
entrepreneurship and the labour market (Donath, 2004; Rath, 2002: 16), thus 
preventing the development of an informal low-wage sector.  
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Table 2. Structure of the German and UK Clothing Industries, 2001/2 
 




No. of employees 
German industry 
(firms with >20 employees)*  560  9.65  53,901 
German industry 
(all firms)**  6,159  14.4  - 
UK industry 
(all firms)*  5,820  8.92  127,000 
 
* Data for 2002; ** Data for 2001 
Sources:  VR2003;  IHK  Bielefeld  data,  2002;  ONS  Annual  Business  Inquiry  2001  and  BATC 
estimates 
 
Our  own  interview  data  reveal  how  divergent  firm  size,  capital  bases  and 
ownership profiles affect firms’ ability to invest in capability building. Table 3 
summarises the characteristics of our 11 UK and 13 German firms discussed in 
the remainder of this section.  
 
Due to the differing modes of raising capital in the two economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001), we found total or substantial family ownership to be widespread 
in Germany, even among large firms, while in the UK inherited family firms are 
more rare and some stock market listing exists. But since the late 1990s de-
listings/acquisitions  by  private  equity  funds  and  break-ups  of  large  firms 
resulting  in  management  buyouts  have  occurred,  often  leading  to  very  high 
gearing for the latter. Whereas several German firm owners emphasised that, 
after paying their own salaries, all profits are reinvested, in the UK priority goes 
to investors and only thereafter can profits be reinvested.  
 
The impact on training and skills acquisition of these different financial models, 
together with national institutionalised practices of and facilities for vocational 
training,  is significant.  British  managers’  capabilities  and  skill  profiles  were 
considered by industry insiders to be ‘generally of very low calibre’ (e.g. UK-
C-6). With a few exceptions, education levels and specialist expertise appear to 
be  significantly  lower  than  those  of  their  German  counterparts.  Whereas 
graduate recruitment is problematic for the UK clothing industry as a whole 
(PSS,  2000),  the  German  managers  we  interviewed  mainly  were  graduates. 
Designers in British firms are not rated highly on technical and commercial 
understanding, although they may score well on creativity (EMDA, 2001: 29; 
TCSG, 2000: 12), and large retail customers usually employ their own design 
teams  (Interview  Notes  2003).  German  designers  also  appear  better  at 
integrating creative and technical design, and our impression was that German 
firms employed more – and better-qualified – technical specialists than the mere 
4 percent of technical employees that CAPITB (2001: 16) identified in British   12 
firms.  Industry  statistics  on  skill  levels  at  supervisory  and  operative  level 
indicate  that  employees  in  British  firms  generally  have  low  to  non-existent 
qualification levels and few opportunities for formal training (Warren, 2003: 
232). The German industry, by comparison, boasted a trainee to employee ratio 
of 7.5 percent in 2001, and many of them were learning tailoring skills (BBI, 
2002).  Following  the  decline  in  domestic  manufacturing,  skilled  production 
work no longer holds great importance in either country. But operatives at the 
technician  level  have  become  the  backbone  of  production  organisation  and 
quality monitoring in foreign production sites of both third-party suppliers and 
within company subsidiaries (Interview Notes 2003, Faust, 2005). 
 
Table 3. Co-ordinating firm characteristics 
  Firm size         
  Turnover*  Employment**  Ownership
++  Product Range  Firm type
+  Exports*** 
UK-C-1  very small  small  private  middle  2  none 
UK-C-2  small  large  private equity backed  middle  1  low 
UK-C-3  small  large  family  low-middle  2  none 
UK-C-4  small  large  MBO  low-middle  2  none 
UK-C-5  small  small  MBO  low-middle  2  none 
UK-C-6  small  medium  listed  low-middle  2  none 
UK-C-7  very small  large  family  middle  1+2  medium 
UK-C-8  very small  medium  family  high  1  high 
UK-C-9  small  large  MBO  low and middle  2  low 
UK-C-10  large  large  family  low-middle  2  none 
UK-C-11  small  medium  private  high  4  yes 
             
GER-C-1  large  large  listed  high  4  high 
GER-C-2  small  medium  private  middle  4  high 
GER-C-3  very large  large  listed  middle  4  high 
GER-C-4  very large  large  family  middle  2+4  high 
GER-C-5  medium  large  family  middle  4  medium 
GER-C-6  small  medium  family  high  1  medium 
GER-C-7  small  medium  family  low-middle  2  high 
GER-C-8  small  medium  family  middle  1  medium 
GER-C-9  very small  medium  family  middle  1  medium 
GER-C-10  medium  large  family  middle  2+1  medium 
GER-C-11  small  large  family  middle  4  medium 
GER-C-12  small  large  family  low  4  none 
GER-C-13  small  medium  family  high-middle  1  high 
 
* very small  = <￿50 million turnover, small = ￿50-249m , medium = ￿250-499m, large = ￿500-999m, very large = >￿1,000m 
** small = <100 employees, medium = 100-499, large = >500 ; includes staff in directly owned foreign subsidiaries 
*** low = <10% of turnover, medium = 10-49%, high = >50% 
+ 1 = Branded Merchandiser, 2 = Domestic Supplier to Large Retailers, 3 = Cut-Make-Trim firm (none here),  
4 = Branded/High Fashion Merchandiser. See Table 1 for detailed descriptions. 
++ ' family'  refers to at least second generation family management; MBO = management buy-out, usually with private equity 
backing   13 
We  have  identified  divergent  patterns  of  institutional  complementarity, 
corresponding to the Liberal and Co-ordinated Market Economy types of Hall 
and Soskice (2001), where differences in firm size, ownership and investment 
horizons are accompanied by stark contrasts in levels of employee qualification 
and  skill.  These  striking  differences  between  the  UK  and  German  clothing 
industry indicate that UK managers face much greater constraints in capability 
building.  This  suggests  that  the  product  and  market  strategies  open  to  each 
industry  will  be  quite  different.  Some  capabilities,  like  the  combination  of 
creative  and  technical  competencies  to  develop  brands,  together  with  the 
financial  resources  required  to  market  them,  have  been  achieved  only  in 
exceptional cases in the UK industry.  
 
3.2 Product and Market Strategy 
 
Steedman and Wagner (1989: 41) pinpoint differences between German and 
British clothing firms in technical design (greater complexity in Germany), as 
well as in fabrics and trim used (higher quality in Germany). German firms 
cater mainly for the upper middle market, with an emphasis on quality, fit and, 
often,  brand.  Their  competitive  advantage  in  international  business  rests  on 
specialisation in niche products (Groemling and Matthes, 2003: 69), a market 
strategy dependent on high skill levels at the upper end of value chain and on a 
high  level  of  control  over  suppliers  (BBI,  2002).  In  the  UK,  only  a  small 
number of firms concentrate on high-end brands. The majority have abandoned 
brand-building  attempts  in  favour  of  the  apparent  security  of  manufacturing 
under retailers’ labels for the middle to low market segment. Relationships with 
powerful retailers remove the need for substantial investments in design and, 
more so, marketing (Owen and Cannon Jones, 2003: 56). Under-investment is 
partly responsible for the failure of many UK textile and clothing manufacturers 
to develop brands and high levels of marketing expertise (TCSG, 2000: 9). 
 
As  predicted  by  the  VoC  approach,  the  contrasting  patterns  of  institutional 
complementarity  in  LMEs  and  CMEs  have  an  impact  on  performance  and 
competitiveness. This is reflected in the divergent export performance of the 
two national industries. German firms have a relatively high export ratio of 32 
percent (Volksbanken Raiffeisenbanken, 2003). Germany accounted for nearly 
one-fifth of the EU’s sales to non-EU countries in 2000 (Euratex, 2002: 86), and 
its 6 percent export growth rate since 1995 exceeds that of the UK, the US and 
even Italy (Groemling and Matthes, 2003: 77). British exports, by contrast, were 
only  half  the  German  level  in  2000  (Trends  Business  Research,  cited  by 
EMDA, 2001: 21), and trade with both EU and non-EU countries is below the 
EU average (Euratex, 2002: 105-6). The majority of UK firms we interviewed, 
even at the higher-quality end, had low or non-existent exports. Exceptions are   14 
brands such as Paul Smith and Burberry, and firms making medium- to highly-
priced men’s suits.  
 
Although  both  Germany  and  the  UK  have  powerful  retailers,  the  index  of 
market concentration in the UK, at 75 percent, is the highest in Europe (Retail 
Intelligence 2000a: 4, quoted by Baden and Velia, 2002: 62). The spread of 
large clothing multiples such as Marks & Spencer, the Arcadia group and Next, 
all of which have powerful own labels, has virtually eliminated UK independent 
retailers, the remainder of which concentrate strongly on foreign brands (many 
of them German). In Germany small independents, although in decline, still 
represent around 38 percent of clothing outlets (Baden and Velia, 2002: 58; 
BBI,  2002:  3).  In  both  the  UK  and  Germany,  supermarkets  have  rapidly 
increased their share of the clothing market during the last 20  years (Faust, 
2005;  Oxborrow,  2005;  Wrona,  1999).  Both  supermarkets  and  department 
stores  are  creating  their  own  labels/brands  and  are  increasing  the  share  of 
garments sourced directly from foreign suppliers (Faust, 2005, Interview Notes 
2004;  Oxborrow,  2005;  Volksbanken  Raiffeisenbanken,  2003).  Last,  in  both 
countries the seizure of  considerable market share by foreign high-fashion and 
moderately-priced ‘New Verticals’, particularly Zara and, in Germany, Hennes 
and Mauritz, poses a strong additional challenge to co-ordinating firms.  
 
In both countries, retail margin pressure has increased strongly during the last 
decade or so (Retail Intelligence 2000, cited by Baden and Velia, 2002; War on 
Want,  2001:  8),  and  retailers  have  sought  cost  reductions from  suppliers  to 
compensate. However, the negative impact on British clothing firms’ margins is 
much  greater  because  of  the  high  level  of  buyer  and  low  level  of  seller 
concentration (Warren, 2003: 233). Verticalisation, i.e. opening their own shops 
to  gain  independence  from  powerful  retailers,  was  rare  in  our  UK  sample. 
Where firms have tied themselves to only one or a handful of large domestic 
multiples, they have no significant control over their market. The durability of 
the relationship is always at risk, since retailers give no procurement guarantees 
for any one season. German clothing firms, in contrast, can sell their branded 
products  through  a  variety  of  domestic  and  foreign  distribution  channels, 
including their own retail outlets.  
 
To sum up, the two national clothing industries clearly contain very different 
populations  of  firms,  with  divergent  capabilities,  strategies  and  market 
ambitions.  In  the  German  industry  –  an  example  of  the  ‘diversified  quality 
production’ associated with CMEs – branded marketers (type 1, according to 
the typology introduced above) predominate, and ‘new verticals’ or forward-
integrating producers (type 4) are emerging. In the UK, most firms are suppliers 
to retailers (type 2) and, in the informal sector, we also find CMT firms (type 3)   15 
– a pattern congruent with the strategy of diversified mass production more 
prevalent in  LMEs. Type  5,  the  backward-integrating  retailer,  is growing  in 
both countries. Although retailer-buyers are also increasing their market power 
in  Germany,  the  countervailing  power  of  clothing  producers  prevents  the 
overwhelming dominance that Gereffi (1994) identifies in the US. The next 
section examines how the contrasts in capabilities and market strategy between 
German and UK co-ordinating firms are translated into the organisation of their 
production networks, with a particular focus on the type of sourcing strategy 
adopted and the degree of control obtained. 
 
4. Development of Global Production Networks 
 
The clothing industry is a highly labour-intensive industry in which wages for 
relatively lowly skilled workers account for a significant share of the production 
costs. With intensification of competitive pressures from low-wage countries, 
felt much earlier in Germany than in the UK (see sections III.1 and III.2), the 
manufacturing  function  has  relocated  to  countries  in  Asia-Pacific,  the 
Mediterranean  Rim,  and  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE).  In  addition  to 
considerations  around  labour  costs,  the  cost  and  availability  of  quota  (until 
January 2005), tariffs, shipping times and the location of fabric producers have 
shaped the geographical focus and control of GPNs. As fabric is the largest 
component  of  final  product  cost  and  additionally  influences  the  garment’s 
quality  and  fashion  value,  the  proximity  of  good  fabric  producers  to  final 
garment assemblers is a much more important determinant in the construction 
of GPNs than hitherto realised. Cost calculations then interact in complex ways 
with  considerations  around  quality  and  lead  time  reduction,  as  well  as  the 
reliability of suppliers, to determine the overall sourcing strategy, including the 
mix of locations. Finally, we suggest that the institutional environment of the 
home country, due to its strong influence on the level of co-ordinating firms’ 
capability, financial resources and hence their general market strategy, becomes 
a  very  important  factor  influencing  sourcing  strategy  and  the  nature  of  the 
resulting  GPNs.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  off-shoring  partly  serves  to 
escape domestic institutional constraints, their influence still remains notable.  
 
Bearing in  mind this complex  mix  of influences, this section first considers 
general sourcing strategies of German and UK firms and, second, explores the 
nature of supplier relationships, along a number of important largely qualitative 
dimensions. Our analysis of GPNs draws partly on available survey data for the 
larger picture, and partly on our own interview data to both supplement and 
expand  currently  available  information.  Our  data  afford  an  unprecedented 
insight  into  the  reasoning  behind  strategy  and  the  quality  of  relations  with 
suppliers, including such aspects as selection and control, length of relationship   16 
and degree of commitment and reciprocity. This analysis also illuminates the 
imbalance  of  power  between  co-ordinating  firms  and  their  suppliers.  The 
resulting configurations are not static. The elimination of quota, together with 
more  incremental  developments  in  both  developing  countries  and  domestic 
clothing  markets,  necessitate  also  a  brief  exploration  of  recent  changes, 
particularly in general strategy. 
 
The  competencies  externalised  by  co-ordinating  firms  may  be  described  as 
fairly standard. In principle, they facilitate easy substitution of one supplier firm 
by  another.  But  suppliers  must  nevertheless  be  considered  as  having 
complementary capabilities. The quantitative co-ordination of output volume 
and  the  qualitative  co-ordination  of  product  features,  all  under  intense  time 
pressure, could not take place through purely market links. Supplier relations 
are subject to contradictory pressures and hence are informed by an incongruous 
mixture of attitudes and expectations on the part of co-ordinating firms. On the 
one side, there is the need for close co-ordination to develop acceptable product 
and process standards and the resulting cultivation of longer-term and in some 
ways cooperative relations. But on the other side, co-ordinating firms constantly 
endeavour to hold or preferably reduce the level of product cost – compelled by 
the relentless pressure for price reduction from retailers, especially those in the 
competitive lower to middle market segments. Therefore in many ways a purely 
transactional mode of contracting is practised, with little acceptance of mutual 
obligation.  While  this  paradoxical  make-up  was  identified  within  many 
relationships,  we  also  found  differences  in  weight  given  to  each  element 
between different co-ordinating firms and countries of origin, depending on the 
products manufactured. 
  
4.1 Types of Strategies and Modes of Sourcing 
 
To understand the sourcing strategies of co-ordinating firms and the nature of 
resulting  GPNs,  we  briefly  consider  two  basic  elements:  1.  the  varying 
combinations of in-house and third party manufacturing, either domestically or 
off-shore; and 2. the mode of third-party contracting, with each mode implying 
not only different cost structures and lead times, but also variation in the degree 
of control over the final product and in the nature of the supplier relationship.  
 
Three  basic  variants  of  the  make-or-buy  decision  may  be  utilised  by  co-
ordinating firms, practised in either pure or dominant form or, more often, in 
some combination: 
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a.  Retaining production in the home country, either in self-owned production 
facilities or by engaging in domestic outsourcing;  
b.  Retaining the manufacturing function in fully or partially owned production 
facilities, through FDI/joint ventures in lower-wage countries; 
c.  Manufacturing to order by third-party contractors, with or without an agent 
as intermediary, usually in low-wage countries in CEE, the Mediterranean 
Rim or the Far East.  
 
When we examine the mode of third party sourcing, at least three important 
distinctions have to be made. 
 
I.  Cut-make-trim (CMT) – this mode leaves the buying of fabric and 
trim  in  the  hands  of  the  co-ordinating  firm,  together  with  other  pre-
assembly operations, such as producing sample products and managing 
the  technical  aspects  of  constructing  the  garment.  It  is  also  often 
described as Outward Processing Trade (OPT) in the context of overseas 
sourcing, in reference to its (now defunct) implications for customs duty. 
The disadvantage of the CMT mode is that it requires substantial pre-
manufacturing investment in fabric buying and also lengthens the total 
lead time. More positively, it gives the co-ordinating firm greater input in 
determining the look, quality and final fit of the product. It relieves the 
supplier of considerable investment risk but also deprives him of the skill 
of assembling all the elements of the final product.   
 
II.  Full  Package  (FP)  –  here  the  co-ordinating  company  no  longer 
buys the fabric and trim, although it may retain a greater or lesser degree 
of influence over purchasing and supplier choice. The fabric is paid for 
by, and goes directly to the supplier, cutting out one level of mediation 
and thus reducing lead time. But it also increases the supplier’s capital 
investment and risk, as well as broadening his expertise. As this mode 
implies some transfer of control over the final product from the western 
co-ordinating firm to suppliers in lower-wage countries, it paves the way 
towards the re-integration of steps in the value chain in the hands of the 
latter.  It  thus  presages the  eventual  redundancy  of  western  firms’  co-
ordination function and the full-scale  migration of the global clothing 
industry to newly industrialising countries. Last, the ‘full package’ mode, 
where fabric is bought as close as possible to the manufacturing process, 
favours those countries in the international division of labour which have 
both viable textiles and garment-assembly industries. Hence an emergent 
trend towards a stronger adoption of this mode (Adler, 2003, Interview 
Notes  2003/04)  foreshadows  significant  shifts  in  order  flows  between 
supplier  countries  and  brings  about  a  reconfiguration  of  GPNs.  It  is   18 
facilitated and further amplified by the end of the quota system, although 
suppliers’  growing  capabilities  and  financial  resources  must  also  be 
implicated.  
 
III.  Direct Buying – direct buying of the finished product without prior 
input by the western firm is currently used mainly by co-ordinating firms 
either for very basic garments or for ‘filler’ items in collections, often as 
accessories to products designed and developed in house. It is, however, 
a more prevalent strategy among large retailers. 
 
Although there exists a good deal of commonality in the way German and UK 
co-ordinating firms utilise and combine these two elements of strategy – make-
or-buy and mode of sourcing – the following account predominantly highlights 
the  more  interesting  contrasts.  These,  it  must  be  reiterated,  are  primarily 
differences between providers of own-brand garments, on the one hand, and 
suppliers  of  domestic  retailers’  own  label  or  standardised  garments,  on  the 
other, which result from and may be mapped onto two different varieties of 
capitalism. In the sole UK example of an exclusively ‘own-brand’ marketer 
with a high export volume, the sourcing strategy does not fundamentally differ 
from  that  of  its  German  competitors.  Conversely,  the  strategy  of  the  only 
German  firm  to  co-ordinate  production  solely  for  retailers’  ‘own  label’ 
garments had something in common with that of several UK firms. But the 
German firm’s substantial export volume nevertheless distinguished it from the 
highly dependent position of its British counterparts. It gave the firm greater 
leeway to choose the more cost-effective and flexible option of using third-party 
suppliers, rather than setting up in-house manufacturing in foreign subsidiaries, 
as many M&S suppliers did. Table 4 summarises the stance of each of our firms 





Table 4: Supplier networks and relationships 
 
  Mode of sourcing 
No. of third party 
suppliers 
Importance of firm 
to supplier(s)'  
business  Production locations 
Length of 
relationship 
Means of control over 
suppliers 
UK-C-1  100% CMT  1  takes 90% of output Turkey  7 years  on-site QC staff 
UK-C-2  some FDI, some FP, some 
buying in  7-8 
takes around 20%, 




mix of long and 
more transient 
relationships 
use agents, roving 
technicians 
UK-C-3 
60% foreign JVs, 35% FP, 
small remaining domestic 
in-house mfg after recent 
closures 
3 
aims for 20-25% of 
output, be biggest 
single customer 
Turkey, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, UK 
long term, not 




section of supplier 
factory 




longest is 12 years, 
but also regards 
own factory 
closures as ' core 
skill'  
regular visits from 
nearby owned factories 
UK-C-5  100% CMT  4  takes 100% of 
output  CEE  10 years  on-site QC staff 
UK-C-6  100% FP  14 
wants to be sole UK 
customer; US firms 
are usually bigger 
customers 
China, some India  about 10 years  low, some technical 
visits 
UK-C-7 
mostly FDI; some FP; 
direct buying of one 
product. Domestic in-house 
mfg recently closed 
few    CEE; Far East for direct 
buying 
a few years; 
haven' t been mfg 




UK-C-8  100% domestic in-house 





mostly FP, some CMT, tiny 
residual domestic mfg 
(recent closures of rest) 
many  wants to take 30-
40% of output  CEE, China, Egypt  prefers long term 
sometimes places 
technicians with 
supplier to raise 
standards 
UK-C-10  80% FDI, some CMT  10 
 
China, Sri Lanka, 
SEAsia, Morocco  longest is 20 years  daily/weekly reporting 
UK-C-11  100% CMT    aim not to be sole 
customer  Italy, China, Morocco  longest is 15 years  regular visits by 
production staff 
             
GER-C-1  one JV, rest CMT  10 key suppliers, 
plus >50 others 
exclusive customer 
in many cases 
mostly CEE, 10% 
Germany (but 
declining), tiny part 
from Asia 
long term 
tight control by 
travelling technical 
staff; use JV to train 
others in best practice 
GER-C-2  100% FP    no particular policy  China, SEAsia, Turkey, 
S.Europe  20-35 years  uses agents 
GER-C-3  100% CMT  >100  seeks mutual 
dependence 
SEAsia, Turkey, 
S.Europe, CEE, but 
strong shift towards 
China 
15-20 years 
local offices in Asia; 
exercises strict control 
over fabric sourcing 
GER-C-4 
FDI, CMT, small amount of 
direct buying, small 








regular visits by 
technical staff; local 
offices 
GER-C-5  CMT in CEE, FP in Asia  reducing (prev. 
high) number  exclusivity in CEE  60% Asia (esp. China); 
CEE, S.Europe, Turkey  10 years 
frequent visits from 
local office, checks at 
many stages of mfg 
GER-C-6 
100% of one process is 
domestic in-house mfg, but 
garment assembly is 100% 
outsourced 
19  100% with many  CEE  6-8 years 
tech staff based on-site 
in one country, 
otherwise trained 
freelancers 
GER-C-7  100% CMT  8 in Asia, 
unspecified in 
normally the biggest 
customer 
China, SEAsia, CEE, 






GER-C-8  mostly CMT, some JV mfg, 
5% domestic in-house mfg    never 100%  mostly CEE; Turkey, 




GER-C-9  50% CMT (all in CEE), 
50% FP  16 
exclusive in one 
case, takes small 
share of others'  
output 
CEE, Turkey, S.Europe; 
Asia (via agents)  aim for long term  roaming technicians, 
uses some agents 
GER-C-10 
mostly CMT, 25% FDI, FP 
in Turkey only, closing 
residual domestic in-house 
mfg 
   
40% CEE; Turkey, 
SEAsia, China 
(increasing) 
long term  own technicians on-
site 
GER-C-11 
mostly CMT, small FDI, 
some remaining domestic 
in-house mfg 
20  rarely seek 
exclusivity 
mostly CEE, some 
Turkey, a little HK  10 years 
own tech staff on-site, 
rigorous info-sharing 
required 
GER-C-12 100% domestic in-house 
mfg  n/a  n/a  Germany  n/a  n/a 
GER-C-13 100% CMT but moving 
towards FP    sometimes demands 
exclusive use 
China, SEAsia, Turkey, 
CEE 
some evidence of 
moving countries 
exclusive use of HK 
agency for Asian 
suppliers 
CMT = cut-make-trim, FP = full package, FDI = foreign direct investment, JV = joint venture     
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4.2 Sourcing Strategies of German Co-ordinating Firms 
 
German firms, due to high domestic wage costs and more stringent employment 
regulation, already began to abandon strategy a. (production in fully-owned or 
third-party  manufacturing  facilities  in  Germany)  from  the  1970s  onwards 
(Froebel et al., 1980). Nevertheless, several firms in our sample withdrew from 
Germany very gradually, and some were in the process of relinquishing their 
last fully owned domestic operations only at the time of our interviews. Two 
firms (one a fully vertically integrated textiles and clothing manufacturer), for 
strongly held sentiments of social obligation to their locality, either continued a 
fully-owned, exclusively domestic production facility or continued to produce a 
small part (16-18 percent) of output in that way. A third was contemplating 
closure of its remaining relatively large German factories and since then has 
executed this plan (GER-C-10). Additionally, a large multinational firm with a 
decentralised  structure  and  market  strategy  continues  to  manufacture  in 
subsidiaries spread over three continents, but retains only a small, somewhat 
symbolic amount of production at its original German site. Domestic sourcing 
for short runs and re-orders in Germany, presumably due to the absence of an 
informal sector and a segmented labour market, is said to be infrequent and 
instead occurs mainly in neighbouring CEE countries (Donath, 2004). However, 
a small number of our German respondents mentioned replenishment and repair 
activity in the home country. Data from a larger interview sample (Adler, 2003: 
74,  Table  1)  put  the  proportion  of  turnover  from  in-house,  domestically 
produced garments in 2002 at 17 percent.  
 
Strategy  b.,  setting  up  fully  owned  or  joint  venture  (a  rarer  choice) 
manufacturing facilities in lower-wage countries, had been adopted by only a 
small  minority  of  our  German  interviewees.  No  firm  adhered  solely  to  this 
strategy – a result that corresponds with Adler’s finding (ibid). In these cases, 
CEE was the main destination of FDI. While one hands-on owner-manager had 
no illusion that the only advantage of this strategy was lower costs, another 
interviewee on the financial side of a large company deemed its East European 
(EE)  enterprise  every  bit  as  good  as, if  not  better  than, the  former  German 
manufacturing  operations.  The  strategy  of  manufacturing  in  fully-owned 
subsidiaries was motivated either by a reluctance to relinquish control or by a 
wish to utilise the substantial machine park from now-closed German facilities. 
A foreign facility was viewed as a competence centre, utilised to train third-
party suppliers and to work out cost-efficient ‘best practice’ for suppliers to 
follow. On the debit side, this strategy was widely seen to seriously restrict 
flexibility of geographical movement and of response to new fashion trends, as 
well as entailing maintenance and employment costs during quiet periods in the 
fashion and production cycles.    23 
Strategy  c.,  use  of  third-party  suppliers,  is  by  far  the  most  frequent  among 
German firms. These strategic trends were evident not only in our own sample 
but also in larger-scale and more quantitative studies (e.g. Adler, 2003). The 
popularity  of  the  foreign  sourcing  option  rests  on  the  following  reasons.  It 
offers a high degree of flexibility; sufficient, even if not complete, control; and 
a low tie-up of capital. Flexibility here often refers to the possibility of moving 
on from one supplier to another. Because German firms have, on average, a 
much higher turnover than their UK counterparts and also retain less in-house 
foreign  production,  they  had  significantly  larger  supplier  networks, 
encompassing up to 100 very big suppliers and many additional speciality ones 
in  the  case  of  one  of  the  largest  firms.  Such  large  and  far-flung  global 
production networks require a well honed managerial capability in supply chain 
management. 
 
Concerning the mode of third party contracting by German co-ordinating firms, 
we draw on the results of both others’ quantitative and our own qualitative 
studies. Cut-make-trim, and specifically outward processing (OPT) has been by 
far their most prevalent strategy, and one that has gained in importance since 
the end of the 1980s (Adler, 2003: 74, table 1). In 1998, Germany had by far the 
largest share – in terms of value – of outward processed clothing among major 
European countries (Dunford and Greco, 2004). As this involves co-ordinating 
firms in the buying of fabric and trim, the making of sample garments and the 
specification of the more technical aspects of garment sizing and construction, it 
affords control over the appearance, fit and quality of the garment. This is a 
course of action congruent with an emphasis on all-round quality and branding, 
but also entails a longer lead time. In distant second place have come both the 
‘full package’ and the ‘direct buying’ strategies (Adler, 2003: 74, table 1). Our 
own data broadly confirm this picture. They additionally show that German 
firms are less likely than UK firms to  use agents to source either fabric or 
garments. Their stronger capital base presumably enables them to set up the 
fully-owned  bureaux  several  maintained  in  the  Far  East,  rather  than  ceding 
control and paying the cost premium of using another middle man. Our own 
data  also  indicate  that  ‘full  package’  was  significantly  more  important  than 
‘direct buying’ – which, if used, was only to supplement the main strategy in a 
small way. One large German firm, whose owner-manager had for a long time 
worked in the US, was unique in using the mode exclusively, as well as being 
one of only two firms to use agents. Last, the ‘full package’ strategy seems to 
be destined for further increase in future, particularly in the Far East. Whether 
resorting  to  FP  supply  will  entail  some  surrender  of  control  over  garment 
quality and appearance will depend on the degree of involvement that firms 
manage to retain in the selection (rather than buying) of fabric and trim. This 
overview of the sourcing strategies of German firms still shows the imprint of   24 
the German VoC, but the surrender of ownership control and the preparedness, 
in some cases, to move between locations in search of lower wages are more 
consistent with a liberal-market approach. 
 
4.3 Sourcing Strategies of UK Co-ordinating Firms 
 
In  the  UK,  systematic  studies  of  make-or-buy  decisions  and  associated 
strategies about location and mode of sourcing are not available, and we rely 
mainly  on  our  interviews  to  present  an  account.  In  contrast  to  Germany, 
outsourcing of manufacturing to low-wage countries started very late, from the 
mid-1990s onwards (BATC, 2003), and during our interviews in 2003 the last 
vestiges of domestic in-house production were being/had just been surrendered. 
Hence strategy a. (retaining manufacturing domestically in either fully-owned 
or third-party facilities) was even more underdeveloped in our British than our 
German sample of firms. The only fully in-house manufacturing firm was a 
producer of higher-end knitwear products, where automated machinery is more 
important than labour. The owner of another longstanding family firm, who had 
closed most sites only in 2002 and still held on to one small operation, justified 
these  decisions  in  the  following  terms:  ‘you  can’t  abandon  everything 
overnight…it’s not all about chasing the dollar’ (UK-C-3). Unfortunately, he 
has since ceased to trade. 
 
But this picture of the end of domestic production is a partial one. Industry 
sources reminded us that domestic manufacturing is by no means uncommon in 
the UK, particularly among the smaller, often ethnic minority-owned firms in 
the  informal  sector,  to  whom  we  gained  no  access.  The  prevalence  of  this 
sector, together with the late surrender of the ‘buy British’ policy by Marks & 
Spencer, is one reason why this strategy continued so much longer in the UK. 
Using domestic suppliers still is the strategy of some British large retailers (e.g. 
New Look), and firms in the informal sector are also used for replenishment and 
experimental  short  runs.  These  firms  often  have  several  tiers  of  their  own 
suppliers  and  use  home  work  (Warren  2003).  Pay  at  or  even  below  the 
minimum wage, plus few social payments, sustains this practice, which explains 
the large and continually shifting population of micro firms in a predominantly 
informal sector (KFAT et al, 2000; Ram et al., 2002; Warren, 2003).  
 
FDI in lower-wage countries (strategy b.), in order to retain an in-house sewing 
facility, was more prevalent than in Germany. It was found to be the dominant 
strategy mainly among the firms that supply exclusively to M&S. The rationale 
for this course of action is best expressed in the words of one CEO: ‘If we 
didn’t own the factories I’d be sitting here and I’d be worried…Otherwise what 
value do I add if I am going to a third party? I am only a middleman, so why   25 
doesn’t  the  customer  [M&S]  go  direct?’  (UK-C-10).  The  positive  side  of 
ownership was deemed to be the possession of greater control, for example over 
making factories suddenly alter a line to meet changing  demand, and never 
having the fear of being relegated to the end of the queue to make way for a 
customer  with  a  bigger  order.  One  firm  also  mentioned  the  possibility  of 
influencing  governments  and  establishing  good  labour  relations  (UK-C-10). 
When asked about the negative aspects of ownership, namely being tied to a 
location  where  wage  levels  could  rise,  two  respondents  declared  their 
preparedness  to  move  again  –  ‘Closing  things  down  is  a  core  skill, 
unfortunately’  (UK-C-4)  –  betraying  their  earlier  protestations  of  favouring 
longer-term relations.  
 
Strategy  c.  (outsourcing  to  independent  third-party  suppliers  in  lower-wage 
countries) was favoured by a majority of UK firms as either the dominant or a 
supplementary strategy. In contrast to the German situation, the number of each 
firm’s third-party contractors, with one or two exceptions, was much smaller, 
ranging  from  only  one  supplier  to  at  most  ten.  There  also  was  a  greater 
tendency to use agents, particularly in the Far East, because the greater shortage 
of  capital  and  human  resources  did  not  allow  the  same  degree  of 
professionalisation  of  supply  chain  management.  The  reasons  for  choosing 
outsourcing differed subtly from those given in Germany. Some firms simply 
did  not  want  the  financial  and  organisational  burden  of  having  in-house 
manufacturing:  ‘I  am  not  in  the  business  of  trying  to  run  offshore 
manufacturing. It’s hard enough trying to sell, you know’ (UK-C-6) or ‘[We] 
don’t have the overheads, the warehousing, the headaches, the staffing’ (UK-C-
1). Others welcomed the flexibility this mode implied, such as being able to 
accommodate  a  sudden  increase  in  capacity  (UK-C-4).  In  sum,  the  two 
dominant  strategies of  UK  firms  were  also shaped  by  domestic institutional 
influences and market demands. Whereas suppliers to M&S felt compelled to 
invest  in  their  own  production  facilities  to  retain  the  level  of  control  their 
exclusive buyer requires, most other firms retained comparatively low indirect 
control over the final product – consistent with diversified mass production for 
low-to-middle market domestic retail customers.  
 
Firms that used mainly third-party contractors utilised a mixture of CMT and 
full  package  (FP),  with  slightly  higher  recourse  to  FP  than  among  German 
firms.  Lower  use  of  OPT  is  indicated  by  more  general  statistics:  outward 
processing of clothing in 1998, to the value of 444 million Euros, was small 
compared  with  Germany’s  3,196  million  Euros  (Dunford  and  Greco, 2004). 
Several firms still in the CMT mode indicated that they wished to move towards 
FP in the future. The reasons for the growing popularity of this mode were   26 
varied,  but  the  fact  that  it  reduced  the  necessity  of  longer-term  capital 
investment weighed heavily (e.g. UK-C-9).  
 
4.4 Geographical Locations of German and UK Firms’ GPNs 
 
According  to  larger-scale  surveys  of  German  co-ordinating firms’  locational 
choices, four fifths of outwardly processed clothes came from central and east 
European states (CEE), plus Turkey (Groemling and Matthes, 2003: 80). Poland 
and Romania were by far the two most important sources. According to BBI 
(2002: 24), in 2001, only eight countries among the 23 largest German suppliers 
were  not  from  CEE,  namely  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Morocco,  Portugal,  Greece, 
Vietnam,  Malaysia  and  China.  Among  Asian  countries,  China  is  the  most 
popular, with about 4.1 percent of clothing imports having come from Chinese 
firms during the decade 1990-2000 (Groemling and Matthes, 2003: 49, figure 
13b). Our own data broadly support this distribution of supplier locations. Most 
firms  in  our  sample  source  exclusively  or  predominantly  from  CEE,  and 
practically all have some suppliers in CEE, mostly for reasons of proximity to 
German design centres and west European markets. But the underdevelopment 
of  the  native  textiles  industry  in CEE  is  now  seen  by  some  as  a locational 
disadvantage.  Turkey,  in  contrast,  scores  highly  for  the  presence  of  a  well 
developed fabric industry, together with good manufacturing; the absence of 
customs duties; and the short lead time its proximity to Europe makes possible. 
But for some of our respondents, China has become or is becoming one of the 
most important locations, having most of Turkey’s advantages, but much lower 
costs. China widely is considered as having very skilled, flexible and efficient 
suppliers  which,  combined  with  the  easy  availability  of  fabric  for  FP 
production, makes it the favourite supplier country in Asia. These changes in 
perceptions about locational advantage are expressed in a marked shift from 
CEE locations to China since 2002 (Faust, 2005: 37). Because of longer lead 
times, however, no firm relied exclusively on Asia. One very high-end designer 
firm even stated it would not consider Asia, ‘because of the quality and brand 
risk’, and this firm alone had many of its suppliers in another western European 
country, Italy. 
 
Information  about  UK  firms’  locational  choices  comes  only  from  our 
interviewing. It shows a strong focus on countries in Asia Pacific, together with 
some Mediterranean rim countries. The greater choice of more distant suppliers 
is consonant with the greater use of full-package, rather than CMT. However, 
CEE locations were not negligible. A few smaller firms (in terms of turnover) 
used only CEE locations for either third party contracting or overseas in-house 
manufacturing, whereas for other firms CEE countries supplemented far-flung 
locations. Turkey is a popular location for the same reasons as in Germany.   27 
Italy, as was the case with the German designer firm, was highly praised by the 
one large high-end British designer firm in our sample. Some of the countries 
where UK firms invested and/or used third party contracting, such as Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh,  Mauritius  and  Cambodia,  had  no  evident  locational  advantages 
beyond  low  costs  and  were  rarely,  if  at  all  mentioned  by  our  German 
respondents.  As  in  Germany,  many  favourable  comments  were  made  about 
China, and several firms intended to increase their presence there.  
 
4.5 The Nature of Supplier Relations 
 
In  this  section,  we  analyse  how  managers  of  co-ordinating  firms  view 
relationships with their third-party contractors, starting with an exploration of 
their  attempts  to  mix  a  purely  transactional  relationship  with  elements  of 
relational contracting. In a second step, we highlight the main differences in the 
ways  in  which  German  and  UK  firms  manage  the  relationship,  focusing 
particularly on the differing degree of control they manage to exert. 
 
The first paradox in building supplier networks and fully-owned facilities is the 
almost universally expressed wish to build longer-term relationships of around 
10  –20  years’  duration,  while  in  many,  but  not  all,  cases  simultaneously 
expressing  the  need  to  retain  freedom  of  movement,  to  escape  feared  wage 
increases.  The  actual  length  of  relationships  –  which  was  much  longer  for 
German firms, because of the earlier start in foreign sourcing – showed that 
footloose behaviour is not rampant in either German or UK firms. But it was 
nevertheless a strategy that firms in both countries envisaged. ‘Every season, 
we have to work on their quality and on their price level, otherwise we are not 
married’  (GER-C-7),  or  ‘I’d  just  move  again…we  only  ever  plan  for  seven 
years in any country, anyway’ (UK-C-10). More UK firms seemed intent on 
chasing price reductions. This must be due to the greater pressure experienced 
by  low  to  mid-end  segment  producers  from  large  retailers.  Additionally, 
according  to  one  respondent  (UK-C-6),  there  are  financial  pressures  arising 
from the high level of gearing accompanying management buy-outs in the late 
1990s.  
 
A glance at historical shifts in sourcing locations by firms from both countries 
confirms  a  move  from  countries  where  labour  costs  have  risen  over  time, 
particularly when geo-political transformations have opened up new industrial 
spaces (Groemling and Matthes, 2003: 80, Interview Notes 2003). But at the 
same time, there were firms in both countries that had a credible commitment to 
a longer-term partnership. ‘It’s a long, very good relationship, we definitely do 
not move about’ (GER-C-7) or ‘We do give people the opportunity to put things 
right…we would not give up a supplier lightly’ (UK-C-3).   28 
 
The reasons provided for cultivating longer-term relations were varied, and, in 
the  case  of  some  UK  firms,  well  illustrate  the  paradoxical  mix  of  attitudes 
towards suppliers. Firms in both countries stressed that it can take three or four 
years  to  train  a  supplier  to  fully  understand  his  western  customer’s 
requirements, and two managers with foreign plants claimed that profit is made 
only in year five (UK-C-10 and UK-C-4). An entirely different reason given by 
two UK managers was that it is easier to achieve price reductions after a longer 
association  in  which  trust  has  been  built.  ‘If  you  have  trust,  you  get  the 
reduction in price points’ (UK-C-2, but also UK-C-9).  
 
Many  firms  in  both  countries talked  of partnership,  give-and-take, trust  and 
gentlemen’s  agreements.  Indeed,  many  small  services  were  provided  by  the 
western firms, and time is granted ‘to improve and adapt’ (GER-C-11). But, at 
the same time, most suppliers were given no contract guaranteeing a certain 
volume of business during a season. Usually they had only promises regarding 
capacity utilisation and, according to several UK firms, suppliers did not even 
expect that customer firms kept these promises. ‘There is no guarantee, but 
there is desire and hope, so often they [suppliers] take the risk that they believe 
us’ (UK-C-4). ‘They will, you know, reserve production happily for us, but if 
we don’t take it up, it’s not a big deal, they’ll find someone else’ (UK-C-6). Co-
ordinating firms receive no guarantees from their retailer customers and hence 
see themselves as simply passing on the insecurity they are exposed to. Only 
three  (German)  firms  concluded  contractual  agreements  with  firms  in  CEE, 
reflecting  perhaps  the  greater  juridification  of  business  relationships  in 
Germany (Lane and Bachmann, 1997).  
 
It  is  clear  that,  owing  to  the  oversupply  of  suppliers,  co-ordinating  firms 
generally hold the power in their relationships with suppliers. (However, one 
UK firm pointed out that the power imbalance in relation to retailers was much 
greater than any power imbalance with their suppliers (UK-C-6).) The degree of 
leverage enjoyed over suppliers was widely seen as strongly connected to order 
volume,  and  many  smaller  companies  were  aware  that,  particularly  in 
comparison with US firms, they do not hold the status of ‘preferred’ customer. 
A few firms in both countries attempted to address the issue of volume sourcing 
by rationalising what had sometimes become an unwieldy supplier base. Hence 
firms in both countries tried to buy a sufficiently high volume – sometimes 
(particularly among German firms) 100 percent of any one supplier’s capacity – 
to  secure  his  unfailing  commitment.  As  German  firms  on  average  have  a 
significantly larger turnover than UK firms, their ability to achieve control over 
the supplier through volume buying is bound to be superior.  
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However, several larger firms made it clear that they would not exploit their 
power advantage. ‘We do have the leverage, but we tend not to use it to pursue 
transactional issues’ (GER-C-3). In contrast, one UK manager of a medium-
sized firm vividly illustrated the degree of power his firm enjoyed. ‘When I tell 
them to jump, they only ask “how high”?’ (UK-C-9). A second UK manager 
recommended to ‘go for the jugular on price’ during quiet periods (UK-C-2).  
 
Another aspect of network management, the criteria for supplier selection, well 
illustrates some of the different objectives of German and UK co-ordinating 
firms. When asked for the selection (and retention) criteria, the fairly uniform 
answer in both countries was ‘price, quality and reliability of delivery’. But the 
UK managers more often mentioned price first and subsequently re-emphasised 
the absolute priority of getting a low price/getting down a few price points. This 
again  reflects  the  high  degree  of  dependence  on,  and  pressure  from,  large 
retailers that UK firms are exposed to – ‘every year the opening conversations 
[with retailers] are always about price, always…Quality comes free’ (UK-C-6). 
In contrast, several German firms, but only one high-end UK firm, either did 
not mention price or emphasised that quality was more important than price. 
‘Well the  most important thing is quality’ (GER-C-5). ‘We  do not put cost 
uppermost, usually we go to countries other suppliers have left, where there is 
accumulated experience. I do not want them to build experience with our high-
end products’ (GER-C-6). Among additional requirements, also illustrating the 
huge preoccupation with cost saving, was one only mentioned by UK firms – 
namely, negotiating delayed payment for goods received by up to three months 
(UK-C-2, UK-C-7, and UK-C-9). A requirement mentioned only by German 
firms was that the supplier should be well equipped with the latest machinery. 
 
A final important issue to address is how and to what degree vertically dis-
integrated firms manage to exert control over their nominally independent third-
party suppliers, particularly over the quality of the garments they make. At first 
sight, it seemed to us that there was no discernible difference between German 
and  UK  firms  in  this  respect.  Both  uniformly  expressed  themselves  highly 
concerned  to  safeguard  the  quality  of  their  supplies  and  mentioned  several 
similar measures to ensure a high level of control, such as various checking 
procedures by specially appointed quality control (QC) departments (in large 
firms) or individual technical employees. QC was particularly stringent among 
the several suppliers to M&S. But a closer analysis revealed several important 
differences, indicating more rigorous monitoring by German firms. This was 
manifested  in  the  following  practices:  a.  unlike  FP,  CMT  sourcing  –  more 
prevalent  among  German  firms  –  gives  full  control  over  fabric  selection,  a 
critical factor in the appearance and quality of garments; b. more German firms 
mentioned an iterative process of pre-production control, requiring the supplier   30 
first to send a sample garment for checking and adjustment; c. more German 
firms  conducted  double  quality  checks  of  garments,  both  on  the  supplier’s 
premises and on arrival at their own warehouses; and d. more German firms had 
permanent  technical  employees  stationed  with  their  suppliers,  whereas  UK 
firms  more  frequently  used  either  roving  inspectors  or  appointed  agents  to 
execute  QC.  Last,  but  not  least,  German  firms  invest  considerable  effort  in 
training and therefore upgrading their suppliers (Faust, 2005), a practice found 
less among UK firms. Thus, the remark by Wrona (1999: 161) that production 
of outsourced garments in reality remains under the influence of the German co-
ordinating firm, ensuring virtual vertical integration, is largely confirmed by our 
research in German firms. ‘With our quality control system with production, I 
think we influence our suppliers heavily, so sometimes they are treated as our 
own factories’ (GER-C-1). For the UK firms, in contrast, such virtual vertical 
integration  did  not  seem  assured,  except  for  those  with  wholly  owned 
subsidiaries. This well illustrates that the elusive concept of quality may mean 
different things to different people and that claims of quality assurance should 
not be accepted at face value.  
 
This overview of the nature of relationships between co-ordinating and supplier 
firms  vividly  illustrates  the  different  imprint  of  the  two  VoC  and  of  the 
production paradigm connected with each. Although firms from both countries 
demonstrated some market-type behaviour, we show that supplier integration 
and  control  is  significantly  more  pronounced  in  German  than  in  UK  firms, 
whereas  a  search  for  low  costs  is  more  prominent  among  the  latter.  These 
divergent approaches enable German firms to maintain the product standards 
consistent  with  diversified  quality  production  and  a  strategy  of  branded 
marketing,  whereas  UK  firms  looked  more  for  conditions  enabling  them  to 
compete  on  costs.  However,  the  German  approach  also  required  greater 
commitment of effort and cost, obliging them to recreate, in an individualistic 





The paper has advanced a number of theoretical claims and has substantiated 
them in the light of data on the organisation of the German and UK clothing 
firms.  
 
It has been shown that, to understand the role of firms in global production 
networks, one first needs to study them in their domestic context, focusing on 
their  competitive  strategies  and  the  different  sets  of  capabilities  they  have 
developed to pursue them. We have demonstrated that capabilities shape market   31 
strategies which, in turn, influence the ways in which firms create and govern 
GPNs. Even though networks are constructed to escape domestic institutional 
constraints,  the  latter  still  structure  locational  choices  and  style  of  network 
governance.  
 
Our contextualisation of firm strategy has lent support to the VoC framework, 
confirming the claim that differing financial environments have shaped firm 
size and ownership, as well as investment behaviour. British firms have been 
shown to be more atomistic in their development of resources and capabilities. 
The  German  institutional  environment,  in  contrast,  has  facilitated  the 
development of larger Mittelstand firms, with better capital bases and providing 
more  support  for  skill  development,  both  among  remaining  higher-level 
domestic employees and among suppliers’ employees.  
 
But  we  also  suggest  that  the  VoC  approach  may  not  offer  a  sufficient 
explanation  for  the  analysis  of  cross-border  networks.  National  influences, 
although important, cannot remain the only explanatory factors. First, global 
production  networks  have  been  established  specifically  to  escape  national 
institutional constraints, such as industrial relations systems and employment 
regulation. Second, these networks and their constant spatial reconfiguration are 
additionally  influenced  by  the  rules  of  both  global  and  European  trade 
agreements, which have decisively shaped the industry and firms’ networks. 
Last, these networks are strongly shaped by capabilities in supplier countries, 
particularly since the end of the ‘quota’ system has introduced ‘freer markets’. 
We  have  indicated  that  locational  advantage  is  particularly  strong  where  a 
competitive  textiles  industry  and  efficient  garment  assembly  facilities  exist 
together, and have explained the increasing drift towards China in these terms. 
Thus, supplier capability interacts with that of the customer  firm, and  more 
work  on  supplier  firms  is  necessary  to  examine  how  institutional  effects  in 
developed and developing countries interact in shaping the contours of both 
GPNs and individual supplier relations.  
 
Our extended study of sourcing strategies of German and UK firms and the 
nature  of  the  relationships  developed  with  suppliers  has  focused  on  notable 
differences  between  them.    We  have  shown  how  different  strategic 
combinations of in-house and third party manufacturing interact with decisions 
on the mode of third party contracting, as well as with locational choices. We 
have  related  these  differing  patterns  to  the  strategies  of  ‘own  brand’  versus 
supply  of  ‘own  label’  or  more  standardised  goods  to  diverse  domestic  and 
foreign retailers.  
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The paper has additionally offered an in-depth examination of the nature of 
network governance, drawing attention to its contradictory mix of relational and 
‘market-type’ arm’s length contracting. Although the latter is more developed 
in the networks of UK firms, German firms do not adhere consistently to more 
relational contracting. The achievement of lower (than at home) wage costs in 
both  cases  motivated  the  creation  of  GPNs  and,  despite  a  variety  of  other 
managerial objectives, remains a strong concern, even if it is not always the 
dominant  one  for  German  firms.  However,  their  considerable  investment  in 
training their suppliers (Faust, 2005), while self-interested, also is consistent 
with a more relational type of contracting. 
 
We have indicated ongoing changes in the construction of GPNs, including a 
greater  shift  of  responsibility  but  also  of  risk  to  suppliers,  and  how  this  is 
impacting on the international division of labour and the locational shifts within 
GPNs.  Finally,  we  go  beyond  Gereffi  (1994)  and  demonstrate  that  the  US 
pattern of one-sided retailer dominance is only one specific pattern common to 
firms from LMEs, whereas the market strategy of German firms conforms to 
the  type  attributed  to  CMEs  (Hall  and  Soskice  2001).  However,  although 
institutional  influences  of  country  of  origin  remain  pronounced  even  in  the 
construction and governance of networks, GPNs also enable firms to ‘shake off’ 
some of their constraints and, in a few cases, to develop strategies in a more 







1 We maintain confidentiality by disguising clothing company names. Where 
our observations convey widely expressed views, we refer simply to our 
‘Interview Notes’. 
2 Some writers distinguish between the two concepts (e.g Teece et al 1997) but 
most use them interchangeably as we do in this paper. 
3 Our types differ from those of Gereffi (1994). It no longer makes sense to 
distinguish between branded marketers and branded manufacturers. Type 2, 
suppliers of retailers’ own label clothing, is not singled out by Gereffi. 
4 Their report reviews data from the ifo Institute for Economic Research and the 
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